

## **Collective Action in Tourism Management: Studying Ostrom Design Principle in the Touristic Village of Matin Abaad**

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### **Extended abstract**

#### **1. Introduction**

According to classical economics, market needs to take care of providing private goods while providing public goods and managing mutual resources is on the government. But governments' inefficiency in these responsibilities had made participatory management and collective action approach important and attractive among new theories. Several researches had been administered within last decades about collective action which was directly related to management of natural resources. Meanwhile, Ostrom, 2009 Noble Prize winner, offered eight design principles in order to create a stable organization capable of managing mutual resources by using INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (IAD). She believed that using such principles make a successful management on mutual resources. This paper tries to evaluate the development of Esfahan north-western villages using tourism development strategy according to Ostrom principles.

#### **2. Theoretical Framework**

There are three methods for managing mutual resources: governmental management, private management, self-organization (participatory management). collective action is best for organizing and managing mutual resources for people whose income is dependent on that mutual resource (and it forms a direct

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interaction between system and its employees; so, in this research, employees of this camp are called either members or users of the system). Ostrom, accordingly, studied subjects related to institutional approach of collective action. Ostrom empirically proved self-organization and its triumph in different cases and she also studied it in a lab economy using Transactional Analysis theory (TA) in human behavior in action environment and proved possibility of people cooperation and participation in mutual goods supplement.

### **3. Methodology**

This research studies the performance of Matin Abaad eco-camp and its characteristics, level of Ostrom principle being used, and its achievements. Institutional analysis and development framework was used for collecting data and analyzing them because the objective of this study was to check the level of success when applying Ostrom principles. Factor limit forms were used for the analysis of principles; in this method, only two limit extremes are checked that it does not consider factors as a specter but checks the factor existence or non-existence. Two classes of internal and external factors that influence tourism management in the area are the two variables of this study. The internal part of this research is compatible with variables that theorists use in order to analyze an official game. External variables had been questioned in the questionnaire too, even though they were not related to the objectives of current research. Considering characteristics of investigating system, questions were selected that were associated with physical and societal characteristics and also compatible with criteria questionnaire. In-use rules and operational rules were included in the questionnaire. It needed indexes for measuring success in the system. Three indexes of reliability in wage and sufficient salary and beneficiary, level of rule violation of personnel, and ordinary behavior explanation of system personnel regarding current rules are the final success indicators that were selected among many indexes for determining the level of success in systems.

Sample capacity is fifty and they were selected randomly. They responded to the questionnaire. Data was analyzed by checking system rules and regulations, assessing system performance and determining the level of system success and ultimately the level of Ostrom principle running in the system.

### **4. Results and Discussion**

This research has two main objectives: The first main objective is to evaluate success in Matin Abaad tourism system. Hence, two sets of internal dependent variables influencing on action status were identified: 1. Rules being used within the system and 2. System performance observation. These two variables are also included in this study because they are influencing factors on action status and will help to have a better analysis even though this is a Ostrom-principle-based study. So, these two variables are assessed by adding them to research's questionnaire and statistical tests in form of some sub-variables. Based on the ratio test (binomial), the rules used in the system with a significant level of 0.005 are strictly observed. The correlation coefficient of the system rules is 1.00. So, it is concluded that the rules running in the system are well employed. In other words, it was indicated that

there are no governmental restrictions for consuming water, land and, etc. Salary and benefits sufficiency and the level of law breaking and members' behavior results indicate that system had an acceptable performance. The second main objective was to analyze eight principles of Ostrom in Matin Abaad eco-camp. So, a set of external variables influencing on action status were assessed and studied based on Ostrom principles. Questionnaire outputs indicate that Matin Abaad tourism system had been quite successful and had administered perfectly and according to Ostrom principles (Ostrom design has eight principles and Matin Abaad eco camp had followed all but the eighth principle which deals with merged enterprises).

### 5. Conclusion and Suggestions

Matin Abaad Village is one of desert villages in the city of Natanz, Esfahan Province that used collective action and participatory management for utilizing region's tourism capacities. The camp's most important feature is its collective action and local management. Results indicate that Matin Abaad touristic eco-camp is a successful and developing example of collective action. Results indicate that Ostrom model brought success to the management of mutual resources by using institutional analysis pattern and developing a stable organization for managing mutual resources. It has a proper potential for activating touristic abilities in rural development. As a matter of fact, this method of managing resources is capable of turning into a proper management pattern in stable development because it is coordinated with traditions of participation, co-contribution and cooperation and also because it lasted in time, evolved and it is now compatible with geographical conditions of region and its society.

So it is suggested that:

- In order to improve tourism, the government will provide facilities for the creation of self-organizing systems.
- To support these types of systems, the government can consider special financial facilities

**Key Words:** Collective action, Ostrom design principles, Participatory management, Tourism management, Matin Abaad.

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